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INTRODUCTION 
As we enter the Third United Nations Development 
Decade!l a sense of frustration and impatience can be 
detected in international debates and among concerned 
scholars. Measured by somewhat discredited yardsticks, such 
as mere growth, progress towards development may have 
occurred in many countries, but the goal of achieving a 
better life for all seems as elusive as ever. The eradica-
tion of hunger is as grave and pressing a problem as it was 
when the first efforts to promote international development 
began. Worldwide unemployment grows more threatening and 
large segments of the population continue to be denied 
meaningful participation in decisions affecting their lives. 
Mindful of the multitude of variables which must be 
considered in solving such problems, researchers have 
progressively stressed the need for interdisciplinary 
approaches, causal analysis, and more comprehensive develop-
ment conceptions. Such insistence is understandable in view 
I The First United Nations Development Decade began in 1961. The 
Resolution stated that the General Assembly, 
"[d)esignates the current decade as the United Nations Devel-
opment Decade, in which Member States mobilize to sustain 
support for the measures required on the part of both devel-
oped and developing countries to accelerate progress towards 
self-sustaining growth of the economy of the individual 
nations and their social advancement so as to attain in each 
under-developed country a substantial increase in the rate of 
growth, with each country setting its own target, taking as 
the objective a minimum annual rate of growth of aggregate 
national income of five percent at the end of the Decade ...... 
G.A. Res. 1710, 16 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 17-18, U.N. Doc. A/5056 
(1961). 
For a critique of the First United Nations Development Decade, see 
the First United Nations Development Decade and' Its Lessons for the 
1970's (C. Legum ed. 1970). 
3 
BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL 
of apparent failure of partial approaches to the problems of 
development. As a result, proposals about development, 
often based on radically new conceptions, have proliferated 
in recent years. Concepts and terminology in the area may 
have widely different meanings depending on the author or 
forum. Borderlines dividing disciplines and issues, science 
and ethics, have blurred. Whether these events will lead to 
more perceptive insights and sharper analysis or, on the 
contrary, reflect an identity crisis in development studies, 
remains to be seen. What appears clear is the need to 
follow the debate closely and to attempt to clarify concepts 
and interrelationships while identifying those areas most in 
need of research and reflection. 
In the last two decades, the world has witnessed the 
emergence of human rights2 as a rallying point for interna-
tional activists. The strength of this movement rests on 
2"Rights" is a term used by various disciplines and subject to 
differing interpretations. EthiCS, theology, philosophy, jurisprudence, 
political science, and sociology offer different explanations of the 
foundation of rights. In legal theory, or more accurately, in positive 
law theories, rights are grounded in the law. They always correlate 
with obligations. This pOint is deliberately ignored in many debates 
and understandably so, since the emphasis on duties or obligations is 
often used to conceal an ambiguous attitude with respect to human 
rights. 
When a right is established in a law without an explicit or clearly 
implicit ensuing obligation, the right is unenforceable. One often has 
to look at the other norms in a legal system to find elements that 
enforce a right established in a given norm or provision. For example, 
a norm may establish the right to privacy in one's home. Other norms in 
that legal system may contemplate the violation of such a right and 
punish burglaries, trespasses or an illegal search by the authorities. 
If such related norms do not exist, the respective right remains unen-
forceable. An unenforceable right may be called a moral or programatic 
right. 
The enforceability of a right on the normative level does not guaran-
tee that it will be respected in practice or that there will be any the 
redress in case it is violated. Weak or corrupt machinery or prohibi-
4 
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~ormative foundations: the universal legitimacy of, and 
respect for, or at least inevitable lip service to, certain 
international'ly accepted human rights norms3 or values. 
The appeal and credibility of the main human rights organi-
(footnote 2 continued) 
tively expensive legal expertise may render certain enforceable rights 
illusory for the poorer sectors of society. 
The foregoing definition of rights is true of many national legal 
systems. In international law the notion of rights becomes far more 
complex, for there is no clear equivalent to the State monopoly of force 
such as that found in domestic law. Of course, force and sanctions are 
applied in the international arena. Yet, despite the important supra-
national machinery that has been established, its powers are more sym-
bolic; nothing approaching a national judiciary or law-enforcement 
system exists in international law. There are enforceable norms on the 
international level, but as many, if not more, merely moral norms exist. 
The sanctions or consequences are more of a moral, pol i tical, or eco-
nomic nature and their actual application depends on a number of differ-
ent factors. 
3Norms may be defined as hypotheses of conduct to which a certain 
consequence is attached. For example, in the hypothesis, "if one does 
not pay a debt," the resulting consequence may be, "his goods may be 
attached and sold to pay the- debt." Since the norm is hypothetical, a 
specific situation is ruled out. The norm applies to those persons and 
situations generally fitting the hypothesis and is valid until abrogat-
ed. These characteristics are shared by ethical norms and norms of 
lesser rank such' as social conventions. A legal norm differs from an 
ethical norm, as it is established by the governmental authority through 
the appropriate procedures. The legal norm also has different remedies 
and sanctions which are backed up by public force. Ethical or social 
rewards or reprobations are different in nature and are not enforceable 
in the sense that a law is. 
Although in many respects the content of legal and ethical norms in a 
given country will coinCide, some legal norms are indifferent to ethics 
and vice versa. Legal and ethical norms may actually oppo'se each other. 
A law is intended to protect some good or value, Except for state-
ments in some preambles to statutes, such values are seldom explicit in 
the law. Their nature and the importance the law places on them must be 
discovered by exam~nlng the 'respective norm and, often, many other 
related norms. In legal theory these values are called juridical goods 
or legal goods. In the norm, "he who kills another person will be 
convicted and sentenced to twenty yea rs in pri son," the hypothes is, "he 
who ki lIs another," is clear, as is the consequence, "twenty years in 
prison." However, the underlying juridical good, in this case human 
Ii fe, must be inferred. As with most norms, when applying the above 
example to a specific case fitting the hypothesis, it must be considered 
in relation to' other norms such as those determining criminal responsi-
bility and mitigating or aggravating circumstances. 
5 
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zations may be found in the relatively narrow focus of their 
interests which leaves more complex matters to political and 
ideological controversy. Their appeal can also be explained 
by :the immediacy and directness of their activities which 
promise concrete action, not abstract considerations. 
Development and human rights di ffer in many respects, 
but both relate to those questions of survival and justice 
which have shown the most potential for conceptual expan-
sion. It is no surprise that attempts to endow development 
proposals with normative strength tend to converge with 
efforts to enlarqe the scope of human rights. Linking human 
rights with development may open the possibility for theo-
retical enrichment in both fields, as well as for increased 
effectiveness in practice. This article will argue that 
such linking must proceed step-by-step on solid intellectual 
foundations, to avoid both the danger of vague generaliza-
tions and the tendency to remain confined within either 
field, merely borrowing terms from the other. 
Part I will discuss the evolution of human rights, 
development, and related international issues. Parts II 
and III will examine the different definitions given to 
human rights and development and Part IV will explore the 
mutual relationships between the two disciplines. Part V 
will cover specific issues such as the rights to food, to 
political participation, to cultural identity, and to labor 
rights. Part VI will conclude with suggestions for future 
research programs on the general rel-ationship between devel-
opment and human rights. 
6 
BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL 
I. THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, DEVELOPMENT, AND RELATED 
INTERNATIONAL ISSUES 
After the Second World War, the independent nations, 
under the strong leadership of the major powers, took prompt 
steps to reshape the world order. The marked bipolarity of 
the postwar period eventually gave way to various degrees of 
political, ideological; and economic deversification and 
fragmentation. But the strategic superiority of the super-
powers, the international military alignments centered 
around them, and the basic layout of the international 
forums and economic institutions set up after World War II 
remain. 
The Second World War dramatically underscored the 
growth of global interrelationships. The establishment of 
the United Nations as an important element of the postwar 
world order symbolized the recognition of global interdepen-
dence. The idealistic hope of the time, expressed in such 
fundamental documents as the United Nations Charter4 and the 
Universal Declaration of Human RightsS [the "Declaration"), 
was for a lasting peace based on respect for the rights of 
all members of the human family through international coop-
eration. Whether sincere or not, these declared aspirations 
lost momentum as the Cold War period unfolded. The United 
Nations, incapable of becoming more than what its member 
4 U.N. Charter preamble. 
SUniversal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. 
Doc. A/810, at 71-77 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Declaration]. 
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States allowed it to be, did not live up to the dreams of 
those who had 'hoped it would be a kind of global peacekeeper 
and the center of a system of important international coop-
eration. Yet, easy cynicism aside, the role of the United 
Nations in the study and approval of important international 
covenants and resolutions, and the implementation of some 
programs addressing certain vi tal concerns ought not to be 
underestimated. 
Although global interdependence was recognized by 
various political elites in the late Forties, the world I s 
attention began to focus on the claims and rising expecta-
tions of the Third World only in the early Sixties. By that 
time, U[a] tumultuous process of decolonization unfolded in 
the African continent. This was paralleled by popular 
organizations and revolt seeking maj or pol i tical and eco-
nomic changes in many countries of Latin America. Similar 
processes occurred elsewhere in the Third World. ,,6 
In growing numbers, ordinary citizens attempted to 
influence the domestic policies of other countries and 
questioned the foreign policies of their own nations. To a 
large extent these efforts gained a momentum and strength of 
their own. In some areas, particularly human rights, acti-
vists focused on the convenants, standards, and implementa-
tion machinery already in place in the United Nations. This 
growing international activitism not only injected new life 
6J , Zalaquett, The Human Rights Issue and the Human Rights Movement 5 
(1981) [hereinafter cited as ZalaquettJ. 
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into the United Nations' treatment of human rights, but also 
generated interest in a number of topics related to ques-
tions of survival, security, welfare, and the dignity of 
individuals, minority groups, and nations. 
Some of these important issues are development, human 
rights, peace and disarmament, and protection of the envi-
ronment. For the most part, these terms reflect contempo-
rary, more comprehensive formulations of age-old concerns. 
What is new is the worldwide attention they are receiving, 
thus becoming the focus of resolutions, conferences, and 
activism by new organizations. Interest in these four 
topics has generated international networks of scholars, 
U.N. agencies, other intergovernmental organizations, or 
volunteer activist groups. 
Unlike the others, development from its inception has 
been a subject of international interest. Although related 
to old problems of extreme poverty and welfare assistance, 
the subject is not just an expansion of old concerns, but a 
new creature, born in the Fifties. Development has probably 
generated the largest number of intergovernmental institu-
tions and programs. It has also led to the creation of new 
disciplines and professions to an unparalleled extent. Yet, 
activism in the field has remained ineffective if not negli-
gible. Development is mO$t often mentioned in studies, 
intergovernmental debates, and governmental projects. Among 
donor agencies, development is generally used to refer to a 
framework or platform. For the most part, international 
9 
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activitism on development issues is not undertaken under the 
terminology of development but rather adopts the language of 
poli tical change and support for other people's struggles. 
Human rights research has traditionally been connected 
wi th the law, political science, ethics, and theology. In 
the last decade, however, scholarship has lagged behind the 
challenges created by human rights activists. Among these 
four issues, human rights stands out as an essentially 
normative one. As such, human rights overlaps with the 
other issues since it covers the whole range of topics 
outlined above. The intellectual work in the field deals 
with the formulation and interpretation of norms as well as 
with the techniques of law-giving. The activism consists of 
enforcing these norms, disseminating their content, and 
denouncing violations as well as in caring for individual 
victims. 
Although other fields contain many normative elements, 
the attendant scholarship attempts to understand a given 
situation, its causes, and relationships. Activists in the 
other fields propose policies and political measures and 
work for the implementation of programs or for structural 
changes. These distinctions are not purely conceptual. 
Because of the relative autonomy of the respective networks 
and institutions, they are also detectable in practice. 
Although covered by some U.N. programs, the issues of peace, 
disarmament, and the environment have drawn most of their 
energy from research and the activism of citizens' groups. 
10 
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Development is the most elastic of all the topics 
mentioned ~nd can be defined to embrace them all. As dis-
cussed more fully in Part II, recent development conceptions 
integrate the fulfillment of human rights, the attainment of 
peace, and the protection of the environment. Nevertheless, 
expressions such as the right to development, the right to 
peace, and the right to a clean environment lead one to 
question whether development and human rights may well 
devour themselves like two lizards, each swallowing the 
other by the tail. 7 By using due care in distinguishing 
between normative and non-normative fields, such a danger 
can be avoided, but there is indeed a great risk of confus-
ing terms and concepts. 
II. DIFFERING DEFINITIONS OF DEVELOPMENT 
Reviewing recent trends in development studies produced 
by intergovernmental organizations,S think tanks,9 donor 
7See infra note 32. 
8 See generally Comm~ssion on Human Rights, Report of the Secretary-
General, 35 U.N. ESCOR 6, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1334 (1979) [hereinafter 
cited as Secretary-General' s Report]; Commission on Human Rights, The 
Regional and National Dimensions of the Right to Development as a Human 
Rigbt: A Study by tbe Secretary-General, 35 U.N. ESCOR 1, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/1421 (1980). 
9Center of Concern, A Comparative Survey of Significant Proposals for 
a New World Order (paper prepared for tbe Symposium of the Interreli-
gious Peace Colloquim, beld in Lisbon, Portugal, Nov. 7-11, 1977). 
11 
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11 
researchers, and military . 12 wr~ters, the 
layman is left with a sense of bewilderment. General devel-
opment conceptions, though, seem particulary volatile and 
short-lived. Not only may a term be used in both a broad 
and restrictive sense, but a term once used to describe a 
precondi tion of development may later be used to refer to 
the process of development. 
Development has variously been defined as: (1) eco-
nomic growth, (2) self-reliance, (3) the satisfaction of 
basic needs, and (4) the fulfillment of all human rights. 
These terms have been used to mean development goals, the 
nature of development per se, or both. 
The original, narrow concept of development as economic 
growth was not due solely to naivete. This definition arose 
because of the limitations inherent in systems such as the 
United Nations. Such constraints were greater in the 
10For recent examples of documents from donor agencies see the papers 
presented to the Seminar on Human Rights and Development Cooperation, 
held in The Netherlands, December 8-12, 1980. See also J. O'Brien, 
Human Rights and Development Assistance (consultedin mimeograph form 
from the Inter-American Foundation) (1981). 
11 See, ~., The Norwegian Research Council for Science and the 
Humanities, Development and Human Rights: A Research Programme for the 
Planning of Norway's Contribution towards International Development 
(1981) (available in English from the Norwegj an Research Counci 1, P.O. 
Box 7188, Homansbyen, Oslo 3, Norway) [hereinafter cited as NAVF). 
12See G. da Couto e Silva, Geopolitica do Brasil (1967); J. Gurgel, 
Seguranca e Democracia (1975). But ~ Comblin, La Doctrina de la Segu-
ridad Nacional, in Dos Ensayos sobre Seguridad Nacional (Vicaria de la 
Solidaridad ed. 1977); Herrera & Garreton, America Latina a la Hora 
de la Doctrina de la Seguridad Nacional, in Las Fuerzas Armadas en la 
Sociedad Civil 143 (Perez ed. 1978). Se~ also H. Vega, Desarrollo y 
Seguridad Nacional (unpublished manuscript) (because of the political 
climate in Chile, this article originally circulated in unsigned form 
among Chilean intellectuals). 
12 
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Forties and Fifties when a few powerful actors dominated 
international institutions. Under those circumstances, one 
can understand why the topic of development was treated so 
narrowly. Today, development embraces questions of subsis-
tence, dignity, and justice, a broad definition which would 
not have been possible earlier, given the state of the 
debate and the strength of certain ideological positions and 
interests. 13 
Proposing economic growth as the only goal of develop-
ment avoided more explicit discussion of other concrete and 
more realistic objectives. Devising concrete objectives is 
an essential element of policy-making, planning, and program 
implementation. While it soon became apparent that growth 
was taking place in less-developed countries, it was not 
trickling down to those most in need. It is not surprising 
that development conceptions were criticized for avoiding 
the issue of social change. Development thus became the 
13In recent years the concept of the New International Economic Order 
["NIEO"] has been added to the definition of development, although some 
consider NIEO to be a precondition of development. In some interna-
tional debates, NIEO has been reduced to a specific set of international 
economic issues. But in research center proposals, NIEO is defined more 
broadly. These proposals recommend a complete strategy of development, 
using the terminology of NIEO by referring to the changes which must 
occur at the national level in order to achieve NIEO worldwide. 
The NAVF report defines NIEO as "a set of demands that aim to ensure 
developing countries better possibilities for economic growth of the 
same type as that in the industrialized countries. These demands con-
centrate on easier access to the marltets in industrialized countries, 
and on higher - more just - prices for raw materials and goods from the 
developing countries. Further items include safety mechanisms to guard 
against large, destructive fluctuations in raw material prices on the 
world market, as well as an end to the financial stranglehold which 
enormous debt burdens have placed on many developing countries - a 
bloodletting that drains already poor nations of what they have of 
currency and profits." NAVF, supra note 11, at 31. 
13 
BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL 
target of ideological controversies. 
The second definition of development, self-reliance, 
has been used to describe a variety of ideas, from strict 
isolationism to a sustained development that relies as 
little as possible on other countries. A self-reliance 
strategy, unlike plans for international cooperation, calls 
for withdrawal and isolation from any external relationships 
that might create dependency. 14 The term in this sense has 
referred more to a means to development rather than a defi-
nition of it. The term also has the potential to be misused 
in political rhetoric. 
A third definition of development, the satisfaction of 
"basic needs,"lS is generally understood to include at 
least the freedom from extreme want, especially hunger. But 
a precise definition of "basic needs" is impossible because 
different enti ti.es have chosen to use the term simply as 
they understand it or as a means of achieving their own 
purposes. In the most wide-reaching interpretations, basic 
needs has included all human rights. In United Nations 
organizations, the concept was the focus of intense debate 
14 NAVF, supra note 11, at 34. "The fundamental idea behind self-
reliance is to delimit, but not eliminate, outside relations. Delimi-
tation applies mainly to those relations that appear to hamper devel-
opment .... Self-reliance has also a cultural aspect: to maintain and 
~trengthen one's own cultural institutions and special characteristics 
and to support cultural self-assertion." Id. 
15"There has been great disagreement as to how "basic needs" are to 
be defined. This disagreement has centered a round the relationship 
between material and non-material basic needs and how important the 
various needs are in relation to each other. For instance, is food more 
important than political participation? Is political participation a 
precondition for ensuring enough food for all - thereby becoming 'more 
important'?" Id. at 41. 
14 
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in the late seventies. 16 International lending institutions 
use the term as a criterion, albeit imprecise, to determine 
project feasibility. Al though statements issued by such 
institutions suggest that they are in touch with the politi-
cal rhetoric that now surrounds the term "basic needs, 1117 
the term as it is used in this context seems very similar to 
the now disfavored economic growth definition of develop-
ment. 18 In United Nations forums, basic needs has been 
understood either as a development strategy or as a compre-
hensive definition of what is "good development. ,,19 Other 
bodies wi thin the U.N. system have claimed that the basic 
needs approach is a pretext to avoid considering New Inter-
national Economic Order ["NIEO"] proposals: 20 The norma-
tive disciplines have used the term in a number of different 
ways, from a rather minimalist understanding to an all-
encompassing definition, including all the elements from the 
different perspectives. Defining development as the realiza-
tion qf all human rights is a relatively new idea, although 
elements of this notion have figured in the most comprehen-
sive proposals for a basic needs s"trateqy. 21 
16See infra pp.28~31. 
17p . Alston, Human Rights and Basic Needs: A Critical Assessment 19 
(1979) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter cited as Alston). 
18For a discussion of the meaning of basic needs and the economic 
growth definition of development see generally Human Rights and Basic 
Needs in the Americas (M. Crahan ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Crahan). 
19 See Alston, supra note 17. 
20 See supra note 13. 
21See infra pp.28-31. 
15 
BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL 
Comments from United Nations officials are helpful in 
tracing the evolution of development definitions in interna-
tional circles. In 1961, the U.N. General Assembly 
proclaimed the First United Nations Development Decade, 
aiming to "accelerate progress towards self-sustaining 
growth of the economy of the individual nations and their 
social advancement so as to attain in each underdeveloped 
country a substantial increase in the rate of growth. ,,22 
Development and economic growth were generally considered to 
be synonomous. 23 
In 1970, the Second United Nations Development Decade 
reflected a shift in priorities and a change in the defini-
tion of development. "The ultimate objective of development 
must be to bring about sustained improvement in the well-
being of the individual and bestow benefits on all. If 
undue privileges, extremes of wealth, and social injustices 
persist, then development fails in its essential purpose. 1I24 
Mere economic growth was no longer regarded as sufficient 
for development. By 1970, the definition took into account 
notions of participation, self-reliance, and NIEO as well as 
ideological concerns. 
In 1978, the Unit~d Nations Director-General for Devel-
opment and International Economic Cooperation stated that: 
22 See supra note 1. 
23 Secretary-General's Report, supra note 8, at 6. 
24International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations 
Development Decade, G.A. Res. 2626, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.28) at 40, 
U.N. Doc. A/8124 (1970). 
16 
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Development is increasingly seen as a process that should be 
geared to the human factor both as the agent and as the bene-
ficiary o~ development; it should be endogenous, involving the 
autonomous defi.nit:j.on by each society of its own values and 
goals; it should rely primarily on the strength and resources 
of each country; it should encompass the transformation of 
obstructive structures, both national and international; it 
should be inha~gny with the environment and respect ecologi-
cal constraints. 
The Economic Commission for Latin America ["ECLA") defines 
development similarly: "The fundamental objective of devel-
opment is to secure the collective and simultaneous enjoy-
ment by all men of all civil and political, economic, 
social, and cultural rights.,,26 
The current position of the U.N. leadership is that 
both people's material and non-material basic needs should 
be met; that all people are entitled to respect, to partici-
pate in decisions affecting their lives, and to be treated 
equally. 27 Of course, there is no general agreement on how 
to achieve these goals of development. 
In sum, development as it is now understood in interna-
tional forums should: 
1) be more than just an economic process or a 
set of economic policies; 
2) include the 
non-material 
process; 
satisfaction 
needs in 
of ·material and 
the development 
25United Nations, Press Release DEV/205 at 2 (Geneva, 1978), 
reprinted in Secretary-General's Report, supra note 8, at 10. 
26Economic Commission for Latin America, The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the Developing Countries, E.S.C. Res. 334, 15 U.N. 
ESCOR Annex 1 at I, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/II48 (1973) (hereinafter cited as 
ECLA). 
27 Secretary-General's Report, supra note 8, at 13. 
17 
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3) emphasize the role of the individual as a 
beneficiary and as an actor; 
4) stress the rights of nations; and 
5) consider ultimate development 
within a human rights framework. 
objectives 
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NORMS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
A. Human Rights 
The most important normative system for international 
human rights is the so-called International Bill of Human 
Rights: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 28 the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 29 [the 
"Civil and Political Coven.ant"]' its Optional Protocol, 30 
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights31 [the "Economic, Social and Cultural 
Covenant"]. The various rights established in these instru-
ments were already recognized in many national legal systems 
following long historical processes and political struggles. 
Human rights may be categorized according to different 
criteria. One broad division places civil and political 
28D I' 5 ec aratlon, supra note . 
29International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. ·Res. 
2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [here-
inafter cited as Civil and Political Covenant}. 
300ptional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Poli-
tical Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, .21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.16) at 59, U.N. 
Doc. A/6316 (1966). 
31International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.16) at 49, U.N. Doc A/6316 
(1966) [hereinafter cited as Economic, Social and Cultural Covenant}. 
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rights in one category and economic, social, and cultural 
rights in another. This distinction is reinforced by the 
fact that two separate U.N. Covenants bear the names of the 
respective sets of rights. Civil and political rights have 
been called the "first generation" of human rights. 
Economic, social, and cultural rights have been considered 
"second generation." These terms are used because civil and 
political rights gained doctrinal and legislative acceptance 
in national systems before the other types of rights. The 
recognition of labor rights, together with other economic, 
social, and cultural rights, gradually occurred in the last 
decades of the nineteenth century and in the first decades 
of the present century as the result of arduous social and 
political struggles and the evolution of the welfare state. 
In recent years there has been much discussion about 
"third generation," II emerging , II or "solidarity" rights. 
Such rights have yet to be formally recognized in any inter-
national convenants. There is as yet no consensus on what 
rights are encompassed in the "third generation, 11 32 but 
such rights are agreed to be collective in nature, and, as 
they are generally understood, are not exercised by the 
individual as is, for example, freedom of speech. Some 
scholars have argued that these "third generation" rights 
should be included in the international normative system; 
32A comprehensive list of "third- generation" rights cannot be drawn 
up, as each writer in the area has developed a different "shopping 
list." However, the "right" to development, the "right" to peace, and 
the "right" to cultural identity are often included among "third genera-
tion" rights. 
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others contend that such rights may already be recognized in 
international law, if the relevant norms are interpreted 
. 1 33 appropr~ate y. Nevertheless, formulae about "third gener-
ation" rights do not really constitute international norms. 
They may be considered as specific proposals for future 
norms, or, as appears more likely, as the advancement of 
values that various writers would like to incorporate into 
the law by endowing them with the appropriate normative 
character. 
Human rights may be grouped in th~ following categories 
according to the juridical good or value involved: 
1) inviolabilities: personal integrity, protec-
tion of privacy, and security; 
2) freedoms: includes a whole range of freedoms 
allowing for participation in the life of a 
society and encompassing even the freedom to 
leave that society; 
3) equali ties: equal enj oyment of rights and 
equal protection under the law without regard 
to race, color, sex, ethnic origin, or other 
status; 
4) poli tical freedoms: rights to citizenship, 
to participate in the political process, to a 
political model that ensures the supremacy of 
the will of the people; 
5) economic, social, and cultural rights: 
adequate standards of life and welfare which 
ensure a decent life with respect for the 
dignity of the person; and 
6) the very condition of self: 
against slavery and servitude. 
prohibitions 
Some of these rights presuppose a correlative obliga-
ticm which is negative in character. It consists of not 
33 See Alston, supra note 17; Alston, Development and the Rule of Law 
(1981). 
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doing an act which would intrude, dispossess, interfere 
with, discriminate against, or enslave another. Other 
rights, of an economic, social, or cultural nature, involve 
a positive obligation. In certain situations there is a 
combination of obligations, both positive and negative. 
Examples include those forms of discrimination which require 
both the cessation of discriminatory practices as well as 
the imposition of positive measures to overcome the current 
state of affairs. 
Who is burdened with a negative obligation seems rather 
clear: everyone. This is valid on a theoretical level and, 
in practice, within national jurisdictions. When it comes 
to internatioanl law, the signatories to human rights 
instruments must be singled out as primarily responsible. A 
more difficult question is who bears the burden of a posi-
tive obligation in those cases in which the obligor has not 
been explicitly determined by the law. 
B. The extent to which human rights are enforceable 
From the foregoing discussion, one can conclude that 
the following elements determine the degree to which human 
rights may be legally enforceable on the international 
level. On a purely normative level, it is important that 
the respective right be clearly established. The hypothesis 
of the norm in question, considered either in isolation or 
in relation to other norms, must describe a situation or 
behavior clearly. It must also establish the subject of the 
right and the subject and content of the obligation. The 
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consequence or sanction must be commensurate with the juri-
dical good protected by the norm. 
References to the protected juridical good are impor-
tant when clarifying the law and when emphasizing the solemn 
character of its mandate. But without an accompanying 
correct normative formula, such statements are reduced to 
either moral rights or mere rhetoric. 
Beyond the purely normative level, the international 
and regional machinery for the enforcement of human rights 
is very uneven; much depends on the respective region and 
the types of rights in question. The following table34 com-
bines many of these classifications and examines the degree 
of correlation between the normative characteristics of 
various sets of rights and certain trends encountered in 
practice. 
34 Zalaquett, supra note 6, at 19. 
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Rights or nora. 
1. Prohibition of slavery and 
torture, freedoa of tho~ght 
and religion. The right of 
every accused to a fair trial. 
2. Right to life, liberty, and 
citizenship. 
3. Right to privacy, the in-
violability of family life, and 
correspondence. Freedoa of 
~veaent, doaicile, and i .. igra-
tion. Freedo. of opinion, 
religion, and expression. Free-
dom of assembly and association. 
The right to own property. 
4. Political rights. The right 
to participate directly or in-
directly in governaent. The 
will of the people as the basis 
of governmental authority. 
S. The right to employment and 
fair working conditions. The 
right to a standard of living 
that ensures health and well-
being. The right to social 
security. Special rights of 
mothers and children. The right 
to education. The right to 
participate in the. cultural 
life of the community. 
How noras are established 
in international instruments 
A. absolute rights: fully and 
presently demandable. Never 
to be suspended or restricted. 
They involve .. inly a negative 
obligation. 
These rights aay not be re-
stricted "arbitrarily." They 
are presently demandable. They 
involve aainly a negative 
obligation. 
As rights presently demandable, 
but subordinated to higher 
values, such as morality, public 
order, and national security. 
They involve mainly a negative 
obligation. They may also be 
suspended or restricted in case 
of eaergency. Furthermore, the 
very content of these rights 
varies in different cultures and 
political systems. 
As very gene~al parameters for a 
political .odel or for the par-
ticipation of citizens in the 
political process. They .ay in-
volve a positive obligation and 
.ay not be presently demandable. 
As needs or aspirations that 
should be progressively met 
through international coopera-
tion and internal effort. They 
involve a positive obligation. 
The degree or association 
in practice with the term 
"huaan right." 
High, at least in Europe 
and the Americans. 
High, at least in Europe 
and the Aaericas. 
Infrequently, with the 
possible exception of the 
United States, Western 
Europe, and Israel in re-
lation to the right to 
emigrate. 
Rarely. 
Increasingly, in various 
Third World countries. 
Position of government 
accused of violating 
h_n rights 
Denial of the acts. 
Denial of the acts or 
statements that the 
rights have not been af-
fected "arbitrarily." 
Rather than deny the 
acts, the government 
emphasizes that a state 
of emergency exists or 
that national security, 
morals, or public order 
are being safeguarded. 
The political regime in 
question states that it 
actually represents pop-
ular will or is a neces-
sary transition towards 
a system that would re-
present it. 
The government asserts 
that its policies are 
headed toward the pro-
gressive satisfaction of 
these rights. 
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IV. RELATING DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
A. The state of the question 
Human rights activists have tried to relate their 
concerns to development questions. These efforts have 
adopted various forms and are the result of differing moti-
vations. Among Third World activists, there has been a 
tendency to consider the eradication of extreme poverty as a 
right with the same status as political and civil freedom. 35 
Scholars from normative disciplines and human rights bodies 
in the U. N. system have sought to relate the concept of 
rights to development36 or to examine the concept of basic 
needs from a human rights perspective. 
A common factor in these efforts is the emphasis placed 
on the equality of social, economic, and cultural rights 
with civil and political rights. In some cases, such empha-
sis sterns from the need to develop a legal theory of social 
and economic rights. 37 In other cases, one detects the 
35 See supra p.23. 
36The International Commission of Jurists has sponsored a series of 
regional seminars in which the Commission's general concerns about the 
rule of law have been included within the larger framework of develop-
ment questions. Following seminars organized in Barbados in 1977, in 
Senegal in 1978, in Colombia in 1979, and in The Hague in 1981, the Com-
mission has published several works containing the contributions to these 
conferences. See generally International Commission of Jurists, Human 
Rights and Development: Report o.f a Seminar on Human Rights and Their 
Promotion in the Caribbean (1978); International Commission of Jurists, 
Colloque de Dakar sur Ie Developpement et les Droits de 1 'Hommes , Revue 
Senegalaise de Droit (1978). See also Alston, Development and the Rule 
of Law (1981). - --
37 But more often than not, such theories begin by stating that all 
rights stand legally on an equal footing, instead of accepting that work 
must still be done to reflect in legal terms an equal standing which may 
exist from an ethical viewpoint. 
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suspicion that the focus on civil and political rights which 
prevails among international human rights activists is a 
reflection of Western values. As a consequence, developing 
/ 
count~ies try to redress the perceived imbalance by stress-
ing the importance of social, economic, and cultural rights, 
the rights of nations, and the need to respect cultural 
identity. 
Human rights activists make approaches to developmental 
questions which rarely delve into substantive development 
issues. They usually discuss development questions wi thin 
the normative boundaries of human rights. The discussions 
center around the right to development or the need to empha-
size the importance of social and economic rights. 38 
On the side of developmentalists, the approach to human 
rights has become more intense. In reviewing the evolution 
of different development concepts, it is clear that human 
rights proposals have progressively entered debates on 
development. 39 Scholars and intergovernmental institutions 
are most active in introducing these proposals into develop-
ment debates. Several donor agencies working in the field 
of international development aid have also sought to clarify 
the relationship between such programs and human rights. 40 
As is common with human rights specialists, developmen-
talists have tended to remain within their own disciplinary 
38 See supra p. 11. 
39 See supra pp.13-l8. 
40 See supra note 10. 
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field, stressing the relationship with the human rights 
system by using human rights language instead of integrating 
normative categories in their own analysis. Nevertheless, 
some recent interdisciplinary endeavors have begun the task 
of bridging both fields more effectively.41 
The ~ost far-reaching linking of development and human 
rights views development as the progressive satisfaction of 
all human rights. In the language of ECLA, human rights may 
be understood as the fundamental objective of development. 42 
By linking the two in such a comprehensive way, one can, 
from a human rights perspective, understand development as 
the realization of all human rights, and from a developmen-
tal perspective, conceive of human rights as standards to be 
achieved through the development process. 
The apparent advantages of linking development to the 
human rights system is that the latter is a relatively 
well-defined, comprehensive system which addresses a whole 
range of questions pertaining to survival, welfare, freedom, 
and human dignity. Moreover, the concept "human rights" 
enjoys considerable moral strength. Such a linking is, 
however, only the beginning of the problem: further defini-
tions need to be made to avoid various pitfalls. 
Among the needed definitions are: (1) the articulation 
of more concrete strategies of development and their rela-
tionship to human rights i (2) the identification of those 
41 See generally Crahan, supra note 18; NAVF, supra note 11. 
42ECLA , supra note 26, at 1. 
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key factors which hinder the satisfaction of certain rights; 
(3) the question of how the satisfaction or violation of 
cri tical needs and rights (particularly those instrumental 
in attaining others) relate to each other in practice, and 
(4) the development of analytical tools to assess progress. 
Some, if not all of these challenges, are formidable indeed. 
The most. serious danger is the overuse of human rights 
language and the consequent cheapening of the issue. Norma-
tive formulae are the result of long processes of debate and 
struggle. To emphasize the importance of a given value will 
not transform it into an enforceable right. This is not to 
say that those values embodied in enforceable normative 
formulae are less important than other values. The value 
tlgood nutrition" could be more important than "freedom from 
torture" but the right to food is less enforceable a norm 
than the prohibition of torture. Normative formulae 
concerning the right to food must be reworked and agreed 
upon43 rather than insisting that, as a right, it stands on 
an equal footing with the prohibition of torture. 
The relationships between human rights and development 
networks are still rather weak. The scientific disciplines 
contributing the most to each field have not quite developed 
an interdisciplinary tradition between them. Action on 
human rights and development has taken different forms yet 
interrelationships are being gradually established. 
43Such a goal would be monumental in scope and assumes political 
consensus has been reached in an area of intense ideological disagree-
ment. 
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B. Basic needs: an example of a concept common to 
development and rights theories 
Freedom from extreme want, particularly hunger, is 
perhaps the most recurring element of basic needs found in 
contemporary developmental and ethical literature. It is 
therefore useful to make some observations about basic needs 
from a normati ve point of view. One must refer to the 
important normative traditions influencing ethical thought 
in Western countries: Christian ethics, Marxist theory, and 
the liberal tradition. None of them focuses solely on human 
rights, nor do they discuss basic needs, a fairly new 
concept. These traditions constitute instead a comprehen-
sive vision of human existence, society, and history which 
is rooted in philosophical, economic, or religious beliefs. 
One cannot judge the value of the human rights concepts 
in these traditions because of their treatment of basic 
needs. For the Marxist tradition, the question of basic 
needs is central, although not stated as such. All true 
rights in Marx I s view are based on claims to social and 
economic equality and only secondarily on claims to politi-
cal equality. 
It is highly questionable whether one can speak of a 
single Christian tradition since no discussion could 
possibly be applicable to all Christian denominations. 
There are, however, certain aspects of Christianity which 
have been increasingly emphasized in the last two decades. 
The most important of these is the "preferential option," a 
preference for serving the needs of the poor rather than 
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emphasizing liberty and accepting the existence of continued 
poverty in society. 
A number of recent studies have discussed the reluc-
tance of the liberal tradition to embrace economic, social, 
and cultural rights or, by derivation, the normative 
supremacy of basic needs in a theory of justice. Classical 
liberal theorists depart from the natural law writers who 
stress positive duties towards others. For classical liber-
alists, the only foundation for rights is liberty and only 
negative obligations may be imposed on others. Liberal 
theory does not rule out competition and it is compatible 
with the presence of extreme want in society. The implicit 
assumption is that the free interplay of economic forces 
leads to an overall harmony that operates for the benefit of 
all. Contemporary liberal thinkers mak~ this point explicit 
by reasoning that the value of economic competition for 
society as a whole produces results which benefit not only 
the wealthy but the poor as well. 
Rawls' A Theory of Justice 44 has become the point of 
reference for those seeking to update the liberal tradition. 
Contrary to classical theorists who were indifferent to the 
questions of which goods people want, Rawls argues that 
there are some "social primary goods" that every rational 
man is presumed to want. According to one scholar, 
Christiansen, Rawls' normative standard for justifying 
inequalities in society is that all social primary goods -
44J . Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971). 
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liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the basis 
for self-respect - are to be distributed equally, unless an 
unequal distribution of any or all of these goods is to the 
advantage of the least favored. 45 
Wi thin' Rawls' standard, however, economic and social 
needs are considered only after basic liberal rights have 
been secured. There can be no trade-off between the right 
to liberty, economic, or social rights, unless the trade-off 
is necessary to raise the level of satisfaction of basic 
needs so that individual liberty can be reasonably asserted 
as the central value. 46 
The distinction between rights and needs is a recurring 
question in other studies. 47 While needs and rights are 
45Christiansen, Basic Needs: Criterion for the Legitimacy of Devel-
opment, in Human Rights in the Americas: The Struggle for Consensus 
245, 273-274 (A. Hennelly & J. Langan ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as 
Christiansen]. 
46In this last statement, authors such as Michelman and Dworkin see 
the basis for a reconciliation between Rawls' concepts and a basic needs 
approach, but Christiansen, Pennock, and others believe that there is a 
clear inadequacy in Rawls' theory regarding basic needs. Apart from 
these authors, others have tried to bring together elements of the 
liberal tradition and the basic needs concept, notably Langan and Shue. 
On the normative question of basic needs, Shue has considered the 
obligations that needs impose on others. Shue distinguishes among three 
types of duties: (1) the duty not to eliminate another's only means of 
subsistence, unless necessary to protect one's own basic rights; 
(2) duties to protect some people against deprivation by others of 
their only means of subsistence and (3) a duty to provide for the 
subsistence of those unable to provide for their own. See R. Dworkin, 
Taking Rights Seriously (1977); J.R. Pennock, Democratic Political 
Theory 16-58 (1979); H. Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and 
U.S. Foreign Policy 53 (1980); Christiansen, supra note 45; Michelman, 
Consti tutional Welfare Rights and A Theory of Justice, in Reading Rawls 
(N. Daniels ed. 1974). 
47Some non-normative studies are often directly opposed to the basic 
needs approach outlined in the text. Economic theorists and those 
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usually kept separate conceptually, they are deemed to be 
intimately related. Christiansen has written: 48 
To describe basic needs as human rights is to tell the lis-
tener that need is more than a Dorm among many. It declares 
that need is a principle with primacy over most other consi-
de rations , including associated principles of justice like 
merit and contribution to the common good. In contexts where 
need is already recognized as the first principle of justice, 
therefore, it will be redundant to speak of needs as rights 
but where its role is only grudgingly admitted, as it is in 
many quartera in the U. S., then the added force of righU 
languaae .. kes clear the priority of need over other claims. 
It should be noted that Christiansen favors a restricted 
approach to the concept of basic needs itself. 
v. AN ANALYSIS OF CERTAIN RIGHTS WHICH BEAR PARTICULAR 
RELEVANCE TO DEVELOPMENT 
The need to consider the human rights system as a whole 
and to resist singling out certain rights as more important 
than others has been emphasized. Such emphasis is needed 
because these distinctions have often been used to downgrade 
some rights or to justify indirectly the violation of 
others. Some studies have emphasized the equal importance 
of all rights,50 but certain rights, such as the rights to 
(footnote 47 continued) 
concerned with geo-politics, often military writers, have emphasized 
concepts that implicitly downgrade basic needs by placing "guns before 
butter." See ~ note 12. 
48Note that Christiansen refers to the terms "rights" and "norms" 
from the normative perspective of ethics and not in a legal sense. 
49D. Christiansen, Basic Needs: Criterion for the Legitimacy of 
Development 38 (April, 1979) (unpublished manuscript). For the pub-
lished article, see Christiansen, supra note 45. 
50NAVF , supra note 11. 
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food, to work, and to political participation, are consi-
dered more relevant in bridging the gap between development 
and human rights. 
Different types of rights have reached very di.fferent 
evolutionary stages. For example, labor rights have been 
the subject of much legal standard-setting in the interna-
tional and domestic arenas. But the rights to employment, 
to food, and to cultural identity are established in very 
general terms in international human rights instruments. 
The right to participation can be construed as comprising 
many different elements, some of which have been more 
precisely defined in international law than others. 
A. Some normative observations on the right to food 
in international instruments 
The juridical good of norms underlying the right to 
food is the protection of one of the essentials of subsis-
tence and self-realization (including optimum social and 
economic functioning). On an individual level this right 
consists of an adequate intake of good food. Malnutrition, 
excess consumption, an unbalanced diet, or the consumption 
of contaminated or unhealthy food are violations of the 
right. If one looks at the individual as a consumer and as 
a potential producer of food, one can point to a number of 
more general values related to the adequate intake of food. 
These values are generally thought of as rights other than 
strictly the right to food: freedom of speech, the right to 
consumer information, the right of association, either as 
consumer or producer, the right of access to land and other 
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resources, the right to work, or, in the alternative, the 
right to public assistance. 
A summary review of existing legal norms reveals that 
in maay national legal syet ... there are eleMents, for the 
.. st part fragMentary, whicA indirectly a.sert the right to 
food. Provisiona e.tabli-.binw the "secial role" of tAe 
right to property and est.li_infJ the p •• ~bili ty of land 
.,..isition or e..,ropriati.n for the purpe.e of a9rarian 
reform are often establisAe. in a national constitution. 
The duties to refrain from depriving another of his or her 
livelihood and to protect another from deprivation are found 
in most countries with varying degrees of legal protection. 
Nevertheless, this is not necessarily true of less evident 
structural forms of deprivation, as opposed to blatant, 
direct acts. Finally, in many countries there are legal 
provisions establishing programs for the alleviation of 
hunger. But the extent and permanency of such programs as 
well as their dependence on budgetary allocations causes 
some programs to be less successful than others. 
In the international human rights system, the right to 
food is mentioned in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and in the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights. In the Declaration, the direct refer-
ence to the right to food is quite general. Article 25 
states: "Everyone has the right to a standard of living 
adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his 
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Article 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, 
social and Cultural Rights states: 
1, The State Parties to the present Covenant recognize the 
right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for him-
self and his family, including adequate food, clothing and 
housing, and to the continuous improvement of living condi-
tions, The State Parties will take appropriate steps [empha-
sis added] to ensure the realization of this right, recogniz-
ing to this effect the essential importance of international 
cooperation based on free consent. 
2. The State Parties to the present Covenant, recognizing 
the fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger, 
shall take, individually and through international coopera-
tion, the measures, including specific programmes, which are 
needed: 
(a) To improve methods of production, conservation 
and distribution of food by making full use of technolo-
gical and scientific knowledge, by disseminating knowl-
edge of the principles of nutrition and by developing or 
reforming agrarian systems ['emphasis added] in such a way 
as to achieve the most efficient development and utiliza-
tion of natural resources; 
(b) Taking into account the problems of both food 
importing and food-exporting countries [emphasis added), 
to ensure an equitable d~tribution of world food sup-
plies in relation to need. 
The obligations undertaken in the Declaration53 and in 
the Economic, Social and Cultural Covenant54 suggest that 
the States Parties have assumed a positive obligation to 
assure food for their peoples. But the language is suffi-
cient1y ambiguous to allow almost any interpretation. A 
51Declaration, supra note 5, art. 25, at 76. 
52E . conom1C, Social and Cultural Covenant, supra note 31, art. 11, 
at 50. 
53D l' 5 25 76 ec arat10n, supra note ,art. ,at . 
54E . conom1C, Social and Cultural Covenant, supra note 31, art. 11, 
'it 50. 
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state Party could interpret the language "appropriate steps" 
in Article 11, paragraph 1,55 t.o mean that it will rely on 
market forces alone to achieve the desired results. 
The language in paragraph 2 is so imprecise that some 
sentences are almost meaningless. "[O)eveloping or reform-
ing agrarian systems,,56 could be read as avoiding agrarian 
reform altogether. "[T)aking into account the problems of 
both food-importing and food-exporting countries,,57 is 
typical of the generalities often found in international 
documents which allow States Parties to interpret their 
obligations as best suit them. 
Article 11 may be an important step in devising inter-
national norms, but it fails to create an enforceable right 
to food. The fundamental problem in furthering the norma-
tive development of the right to food is the difficulty 
inherent in establishing clear, positive obligations in 
international instruments. 
It is much easier to obtain consensus in those rare 
circumstances in which the right to food can be construed as 
a negative obligation, such as the prohibition of the 
aggressive marketing of infant formula. 58 The banning of 
certain practices in trade, production, and advertising 
implies a relatively more simple mandate than when the 
55Id • 
56Id • 
57Id . 
58 see , ~, International Code of Marketing Breastmilk Substitutes, 
W.H.A. Res. 34.22 Annex, W.H.O. Doc. A34/UR/15, (15th plen. mtg.) (1981). 
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solution to a problem calls for the implementation of a 
positive obligation. The key to devising positive obliga-
tions in regard to the right to food is to identify first 
those issues on which experts and governments are most 
likely to agree. Such a consensus may initially be reached 
by framing positive duties as negative obligations. 
Another step towards the establishment of positive 
duties is the creation of reporting mechanisms. Such report-
ing increases the accountability and responsibility of 
States and international lending institutions with respect 
to the right to food. However, reporting plays only a 
complementary role and, lacking agreement on substance, 
often becomes tailored to the views of the particular repor-
ter. 59 
By examining the gaps in international law regarding 
59 A more useful approach studies concrete examples which. seem to 
violate the right to food and, from that perspective, examines further 
the values implicit in those circumstances. One scholar seemed to 
suggest such an approach and the reader might consider under what 
circumstances the following would constitute a violation of the right to 
food: 
Country A, a relatively affluent country, has no guaranteed food 
program in the public sector, or has a program which bars substantial 
numbers of needy persons from eligibility; 
Country B, a developing country, pursues a development policy which 
results in increased starvation for the poorest twenty percent of the 
population due to inflation, unemployment, and the absence of special 
measures regarding food; 
Country C, a substantial food producer and importer, will not divulge 
information on domestic food production, imposes unilateral export 
embargoes without international warning, or takes other secret indepen-
dent steps which disrupt global planning, and 
Transnational corporation A, with encouragement from home and host 
governments, uses scare land, water, and investment credits to produce 
cash crops for export in a country where large numbers of the population 
are starVing, or markets a non-nutritious food product to the poor with 
misleading advertising techniques. Notes from a private conversation 
with Ann Blyberg, Chairman, U.S. Section, Amnesty International, in 
Seattle, Washington. 
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the right to food and by using the described approaches the 
right to food can be enhanced and developed. 
B. The right to work 
The International Labour Organization [the "ILO"), now 
a specialized agency within the U.N. system, was originally 
established in 1919. The ILO has done a great deal of work 
in setting normative standards in the last fifty years. 
These standards are contained in two basic types of docu-
ments: Conventions, which create binding obligations, and 
Recommendations, which are intended as a guide to policy, 
legislation, and practice. OVer three hundred Conventions 
and Recommendations have already been adopted. By June 
1980, ILO Conventions had received over 4,800 ratifications 
from member States. The adoption of Conventions and Recom-
mendations requires a two-thirds vote of the members at the 
International Labour Conference which is composed of 
national representatives of governments, employers, and 
workers. 
In addition, the ILO has developed an elaborate system 
of supervision to facilitate implementation of its stan-
dards. states which have ratified ILO Conventions must 
report every year to the ILO Director-General on the steps 
taken to ensure implementation. Such reports are examined. 
by the ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Con-
ventions and Recommendations and its conclusions are 
discussed yearly by a special tripartite committee composed 
of governments, employers, and workers. Such procedures 
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have proven effective in ~nfluencing changes ln national 
legislation. In addltion, complaints of non-compliance with 
the terms of a ratified convention may be initiated in 
various ways against the respective member State. and a 
commission of Inquiry may be set up. Special ILO machinery 
also exists to deal with freedom of association complaints. 
Because of the ILO standard-setting endeavors, the 
labor rights in the Declaration and in the two U. N. Cove-
nants are by far the most elaborate. The ILO had already 
been in existence for thirty years when the Declaration was 
written in 1948. This explains in part why labor rights are 
defined in such detail in as concise. a document as the 
Declaration. 
Article 23: 
1. Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employ-
ment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protec-
tion against unemployment. 
2. Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to 
equal pay for equal work. 
3. Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable 
remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence 
worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by 
other means of social protection. 
4. Everyone has the right to form and join trade unions for 
the protection of his interests. 
Article 24: 
Everyone has the rights to rest and leisure, including reason-
able6Qlimi tation of working hours and periodic holidays with 
pay. 
Article 24 is unique because it demonstrates a level of 
specificity not found elsewhere in the Declaration. This is 
b · d . 61 ecause Artlcle 24 was based on ILO-approve Conventlon 52 
60Declaration, supra note 5, arts. 23-24, at 75. 
61Convention (No.52) Concerning Annual Holidays with Pay, adopted 
June 24, 1936, 40 U.N.T.S. 137 (amended 1946). 
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regarding the right to holiday with pay which was ratified 
in 1936, twelve years before the creation of the Declara-
tion. 
Article 23 is the compression of hundreds of pages of 
previous ILO Conventions and Recommendations into a few 
lines. As such, the principles expressed therein were 
hardly new or reVOlutionary. Article 23 distinguishes among 
various types of labor rights: 
1) Indi vidual freedoms: freedom to choose employ-
ment, prohibition of forced labor, and freedom of 
association in the sense of being free to form and to 
join trade unions. From a legal point of view, such 
labor rights may be placed in the category of civil 
and political rights. In fact, although labor rights 
are mentioned in the Economic, Social and Cultural 
'Covenant in Articles 6, 7, and 8, Article 22 of the 
civil and Political Covenant regards labor rights as 
freedoms and repeats parts of the text of the Econom-
ic, Social and Cultural Covenant. 
2) Economic and social protections for the employed 
worker: in the contractual labor relationship mini-
mum standards regarding conditions of work and remun-
eration. 
3) The rights not to be discriminated against 
because of certain personal characteristics: age, 
race, sex, ethnic origin, religious affiliation, etc. 
4) Trade union rights: the distinction should be 
made between the freedom to join a union and the 
rights of a member who has already joined. The 
member should have the same rights as the trade union 
itself, including the rights to collective bargaining 
and to strike. Trade union rights may be considered 
a particular form of the right of association, the 
right to assembly, or a combination of various rights 
and freedoms. However, such categories do not do 
justice to the richness and complexity of the legal 
theory of union rights. The very purpose of trade 
unions and union rights and freedoms is the achieve-
ment of many of the objectives listed under the 
general set of economic, social, and cultural rights. 
However, as with economic, social, and cultural 
rights, the acceptance of trade union rights is very 
much contingent on the economic, social, arid cultural 
condi tions as well as the political climate of the 
country. 
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5) The right to employment: actual availability 
depends upon social and economic factors. The Con-
ventions and Recommendations which have been termed 
the "International Labour Code" are impressive as 
a comprehensive set of norms on most aspects of labor 
rights, but the right to employment itself is 
excluded. 
The International Labour Code, which includes Conven-
tion No.2 of 1919,62 Convention No. 44 of 1934,63 Conven-
tion No. 88 of 1948, 64 and Convention No. 122 of 1964, 65 
addresses the question of unemployment. But the provisions 
of these Conventions are too general to provide effective 
legal protection against unemployment. In effect, by rati-
fying such Conventions, the States Parties commit themselves 
to a "major goal and active policy designed to promote full, 
productive, and freely chosen employment. ,,66 Such a goal 
appears to be a positive obligation, but, as framed, is 
little more than an exhortation. 
The most valuable set of ILO normative standards con-
centrates almost exclusively on the freedoms to form and to 
join unions, on banning discrimination, and, for the most 
part, on regulating already existing contractual labor 
relations. The international normative protections of the 
right to work per se are, as discussed above, meager. 
62Convention (No.2) Concerning Unemployment, adopted November 28, 
1919, 38 U.N.T.S. 41 (amended 1946). 
63Convention (No.44) Ensuring Benefits or Allowances to the Involun-
tarily Unemployed, adopted June 23, 1934, 40 U.N.T.S. 45 (amended 1946). 
64Convention (No. 88) Concerning the Organization of the Employment 
Service, adopted July 9, 1948, 70 U.N.T.S. 85. 
65Convention (No. 122) Concerning Employment Policy, adopted July 9, 
1964, 569 U.N.T.S. 65. 
66 Id . 
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C. The right to participation 
The concept of participation has entered the language 
of development studies, social sciences, and church groups 
in recent years. As with terms like basic needs and self-
reliance, participation has been used in various contexts. 
Yet the idea of having a meaningful say in the events 
affecting one's life underlies most definitions of the term. 
More specific definitions such as "political participation," 
"participation in the cultural, associative life of the 
community," or "participation in the work-place" are often 
used. In the same vein, the Declaration states in Arti-
cle 21: 
1. Everyone has the right to take part in the government of 
his country, directly or through freely chosen representa-
tives. 
2. Everyone has the right of equal access to public service 
in his country. 
3. The will of the people shall be the basis of the author-
ity of the government: this will shall be expressed in 
periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal 
suffrage and shall be ffld by secret vote or by equivalent 
free voting procedures. 
Article 2S of the Civil and Political covenant6~ substan-
tially mirrors this provision, although the explicit refer-
ence to the will of the people as the basis of governmental 
authority is deleted. 
Political participation in the Declaration and the 
Civil and Political Covenant includes the freedom to partic-
ipate in the political process as it functions at present; a 
67Declaration, supra note 5, art. 21, at 75. 
68Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 29, art. 25, at 55. 
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cor·ollary of this freedom is the right to gain and to 
maintain citizenship. In this sense, political freedoms may 
be considered presently demandable rights. But the norms 
regarding political rights establish a political model which 
may not exist in many countries. The value protected by 
such norms may be "democracy" but only in the sense of 
ensuring free, periodic elections and the rights of all 
ci tizens to elect and to run for public office. Such a 
delineation is general enough to allow widely differing 
political systems to contend that they fulfill the implicit 
democratic value. Thus, inasmuch as it assumes a democratic 
system which may not exist in practice, the respective norm 
is not presently demandable. 
One can argue that the civil liberties and union rights 
established in the Declaration and in both U. N. Covenants 
constitute an assertion of the right to participate at 
di fferent levels in the affairs of the community, although 
the expressions "participation" and "to take part" are 
seldom used. In that sense, there are certainly grounds to 
assert that this is a legal foundation for the right to 
participation. It is to these grounds which Alston refers 
when he classifies civil and political rights according to 
their potential for creating structural change. To Alston, 
the right to rebel against tyranny (a right implicitly 
recognized in the preamble69 to the Declaration), is, of 
69 The preamble to the Declaration states: "[wjhereas it is essen-
tial, if man is not to be compelled as a last resort, to rebellion 
against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by 
the rule of law .... " Declaration, supra note 5, preamble, at 71. 
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. course, most closely related to major structural change in a 
society. Such a right could hardly be exercised in any 
system. Its normative recognition may come retroactively, 
when and if the rebels succeed. The right to participation, 
if effectively ensured, has the strong potential for struc-
turally changing a society. As Alston correctly points out, 
a dictatorship may eventually decrease or suspend its most 
blatant repressive practices, but for the dictatorship to 
grant an effective right to participation would be against 
its nature. 70 
D. The right to cultural identity 
The right to a cultural identity has been identified as 
a "comprehensive right of importance for the realization of 
most other human rights." 71 Under this definition, "cul-
tural" is given a broad meaning. The term "right" is used 
to mean, from a normative point of view, what would be 
termed a "value." Cultural identity may indeed be a value 
of great importance, but it is not yet an enforceable norm. 
The principal international human rights documents make 
few explicit references to culture. The Declaration does 
refer to the right to participate freely "in the cultural 
life of the community," but it is clear from the text that 
"cuI ture" is used in a rather narrow sense. 72 The most 
70Co=aent8 by Phillip Alston, U.N. Workshop on the Right to Food, 
held in Norway (Sept. 1981). 
71 NAVF, supra note 11, at 57. 
72The Declaration states that "[elveryone has the right freely to 
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direct reference to culture can be found in Article 27 in 
the Civil and Political Covenant: "In those States in which 
ethnic" religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons 
belonging [emphasis added] to such minorities shall not be 
denied the right, in community with the other members of 
their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and to 
practice their own religion, or to use their own language.,,73 
Other relevant normative references are found in 
Article 11, of both U.N. covenants,74 whereby all peoples 
are declared to have the right of self-determination. The 
beneficiaries of the declared right are a collective entity: 
peoples or minorities and "persons belonging" to such 
groups. Individual exercise of the right to cultural iden-
tity cannot really be distinguished from the exercise of 
civil liberties and other freedoms (the freedom to speak 
one's own language or the freedom to profess one's own 
religion) . The right to cultural identity differ from the 
others because the included freedoms are exercised by 
(footnote 72 continued) 
participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and 
to share in scientific advancement and its benefits." Declaration, 
supra note 5, art. 27, at 76. 
73Civil and Politcal Covenant, supra note 29, art. 27, at 56. 
74The Civil and Political Covenant and the Economic, Social and 
Cultural Covenant state in identical language that, "(a)11 peoples have 
t.he right. of self-det.ermination. By virt.ue of t.hat right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, 
social and cultural development." Civil and Political Covenant, supra 
note 29, art. 11, at 53; Economic, Social and Cultural Covenant, supra 
note 31, art. 11, at. 49. 
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minorities in larger societies. The cultural values of 
minorities are given much more protection under most domes-
tic legal systems than under international law. 
The difficulties implicit in the right to cultural 
identi ty suggest that the right to participation is a more 
ea.ily attained goal of development. These considerations 
have led some scholars to recommend that the right to 
part~cipation, rather than the right to a cultural identity, 
be used when identifying future research projects. 
A more productive approach to the issue of human rights 
examines how the content of such rights in the international 
human rights documents is understood in different cultures 
or political systems. During negotiations, differences are 
often reconciled by agreeing to sufficiently general or 
vague wordings or to enough exceptions to allow for a wide 
range of interpretations to the adopted provisions. An 
example of this process is the difference in interpretation 
of the freedom of expression or of the right to own property 
in ideologically opposed States. 
VI • SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH PROGRAMS 
In conclusion, proposals for further research programs 
focusing on development. and human rights will be made. 
These proposals aim to advance practical development 
research, to use human rights as a unifying framework which 
is morally acceptable and realistic, and to encourage inter-
disciplinary research which brings together researchers from 
the North and the South. 
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Addi tional research on human rights concepts implicit 
in development propositions and vice-versa, would be useful. 
If one aims to reinforce development issues by lending them 
the normative strength of the human rights framework, it is 
important to understand how both development and human 
rights relate to each other. Development concepts do 
contain a position on such normative questions as devising a 
hierarchy of rights, formulating trade-offs, and setting 
priori ties. On the other hand, key human rights advocates 
also advance normative propositions which can only be met by 
fundamental changes in society. 
Another area of research would discover the social 
costs of certain economic policies. 
the trade-offs made in the name 
These social costs are 
of development. Labor 
rights, social welfare, and other similar programs are 
temporarily sacrificed for the sake of economic development. 
The implicit promise is made that such sacrifices will be 
more than compensated for by the improvement in the economy 
which is to follow. Research projects in the area of social 
costs should concentrate on the effects on economic policies 
at micro-economic levels. The liberal approach, Marxist 
theories, and Christian ethics may give different answers to 
the question of which sacrifices are ethically permissible 
for the sake of development. 
If changes within a society are a prerequisite of 
development, research on the preconditions for such change 
is essential as an intermediate step. Research projects in 
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this area should focus on speci fic topics. For example, 
adequate political participation may be a precondition of 
development. If the enforcement of trade union rights may 
be considered a precondition for meaningful political 
participation, the question then becomes, what are the 
necessary conditions which will ensure strong trade union 
rights? If the unions are relatively well-structured, the 
focus may be on those institutional changes which are needed 
to give unions the power to influence economic planning. 
Similar research projects could focus on the role of women 
or of various minority groups. 
The most expansive definition of development is the 
realization of human rights for all peoples. For the defi-
nition to be more than an abstract concept, however, inter-
national institutions must reach agreement on the content of 
human rights and on criteria for measuring success in the 
struggle for the enforcement of particular rights. The 
wedding of development and human rights could endow develop-
ment with norms and values and give concrete objectives to 
the human rights field. When agreement is reached on termi-
nology and methodology, public and private international 
organizations will be able to concentrate on development and 
on the fulfillment of human rights for all nations. 
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